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Summary
The paper will discuss the development opportunities of the Adriatic as a 
European region of the future. It will also present some issues related to the difficult 
implementation of an integrated cross-border development vision within the EU, in 
particular for what the ‘multi-level’ governance is concerned. The main related issues 
in the Adriatic embrace the difficult creation of European Groupings of Territorial 
Cooperation (EGTCs), the implementation of the so-called Espoo Convention and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) perspective for an integrated 
coastal and regional management, within which the Adriatic could represent a special 
development priority for the European Union (EU) as the Baltic region within the so-
called Northern Dimension. The paper will show how the discussed case study opens the 
need for a more appropriate governance of different horizontal (spatial and sectorial) 
as well as vertical (hierarchical) policies in planning cross-border cooperation or 
social and spatial (re)integration of borderlands and population, especially if we try 
to create a more sustainable and ‘long-lasting’ development plan for our increasingly 
globalised and co-dependent future European ‘common home’.
* milan Bufon, Professor, PhD., Department of geography, institute for social studies, 
University of Primorska, Titov trg 4, si-6000 Koper/capodistria, slovenia; 
email: milan.bufon@upr.si
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1 Introduction
The problems related to sustainable development planning in Europe are connected 
with the problem of cross-border, i.e. inter-state and inter-regional cooperation and 
adopting joint development programmes within the framework of a supra-state system 
like for instance the European Union (EU). in this area, the EU has adopted many 
initiatives, which would bring more harmonised forms of social and spatial planning 
in the European region. On the local level, the interreg programme has been evolving 
for a longer period, and now includes all ‘internal’ and ‘external’ borderlands of the 
EU member states. for the purpose of improving the coordination of cross-border 
initiatives and projects, the European commission in 2004 proposed the establishment 
of permanent cooperation bodies that would on the one hand enable a more structured 
implementation of Article 159 of the Treaty of the European community regarding 
internal economic and social cohesion, including the redistribution of a part of the EU 
budget to its less-developed regions, and on the other hand introduce a new legal order 
in the European practice, which would take the ‘governance’ of cross-border regions 
and the so-called Euroregions out of the exclusive jurisdiction of national sovereignty 
and thus enable them to communicate closer and more directly with the European 
development authorities in Brussels (Scott 2006). Due to this ‘dual’ character, the 
initiative faces all problems, typical of the contradictory search for balance between 
convergence and divergence that constantly follows the process of European integration. 
consequently, we face many different interpretations of the function and nature of 
Euroregions: under this term, some understand only a combination of two or several 
borderlands that are instrumentally connected only by the wish for receiving European 
subsidies from the interreg programme; others believe that these are institutional bodies 
that have to establish certain joint bodies for joint management of their development 
programmes; another opinion is that Euroregions are not only co-dependent areas in 
socio-economic terms, but that they are also socio-culturally linked by a joint regional 
affiliation (Bufon 2011a). The article will present some issues related to the difficult 
implementation of an integrated cross-border development vision in Europe, based on 
the case of the Adriatic region.
2 eU regulations
EU Regulation No. 1082 from 2006 based on the commission’s proposal for 
closer cross-border cooperation clearly reflects the compromise between regional 
aspirations and state control. it offered the possibility for forming the European 
grouping of Territorial cooperation (EgTc) not only to border, but also to other 
European regions seeking to develop interregional cooperation and planning, but 
at the same time it specified that EGTCs are submitted to the decisions of national 
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central bodies (lanGer 2007). The difficult enforcement of the European ‘multi-level’ 
governance system is also shown in the field of wider spatial planning and verification 
of its environmental and cross-border impacts. An additional problem here are the 
different legal aspects of social and spatial ‘co-governance’ of cross-border areas and 
cross-border projects, or the relations between the classic, centralistic (national), and 
the new ‘European’ planning system, which is quite more ‘democratic’, but also more 
complex and time-consuming, since the decision-making process also includes the 
public and local community, interested in individual projects, and requires in addition 
an appropriate inter-state and cross-border agreement in all those cases when plans 
could provide cross-border impacts (Macrory & turner 2003).
This issue was first addressed by the European Community in 1987 within the 
scope of implementing the Environmental Action Programme, recommending in this 
context a greater participation of the ‘public’ and ‘local’ actors in the planning process. 
The same recommendations were emphasised by the Rio Declaration of the UN 
conference on Environment and Development (UNcED) of 1992. The EU member 
states were also guided in this direction by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which 
on the basis of the ‘subsidiarity’ principle recommended that all decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizens of the Union. Otherwise, the European commission 
(Ec) regulative of 1985 demanded from member states that in case of interventions with 
possible cross-border environmental impacts all necessary information on the project 
should be given to involved neighbouring countries and their opinions considered 
in the process of implementing the project. This directive was followed by the Ec 
convention on Environmental impact Assessment in a Transboundary context (the so 
called Espoo Convention), which was operationalised mostly by the EU Directive of 
1997. The latter demands from member states to provide to the interested local public 
on both sides of the border all the information related to projects with expected cross-
border impact. in this way, the procedure of planning interventions with cross-border 
impact actually includes local community administrations as well as neighbouring 
countries or neighbouring local administrations.
By stimulating a higher and more intense form of inter-state cooperation, the 
EU has started to evolve own, ‘communitarian’ development and spatial policies, 
in particular in the field of urban systems, urban-rural relationships, infrastructural 
systems, and preservation of natural and cultural heritage. such a ‘common’ policy 
would improve measures designed for the achievement of the general EU goals related 
to a ‘sustainable’ development and the ‘unity in diversity’ paradigm. These development 
visions do not consider national borders as the usual limit for traditional planning, thus 
they strive to strengthen internal cohesion in the EU area by stimulating pan-European 
projects. A clear result of joint planning efforts is the European spatial Development 
Perspective (EsDP) of 1999, within which the planning of the so-called trans-European 
transport network (TEN-T) as well as the planning of joint development visions in 
wider regional contexts like the Baltic Region, the Atlantic Arc and the mediterranean 
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Region (EUROMED) have evolved. In the 2007-2013 financial period, 8 bn € were 
intended for targeting European territorial cooperation, which are allocated to as many 
as 53 different cross-border cooperation programmes (which accounts for 74% of total 
funding) and 13 areas of transnational and interregional cooperation (which accounts 
for the remaining 26% of total funding). A general extended cooperation planning 
programme is then the European Observation Network for Territorial Development 
and cohesion programme (EsPON), providing grounds and funds for bottom-up and 
regional-based shared development initiatives. in the recent period, transport- and 
environment-related issues on the EU level have been linked to energy-related issues, 
mostly in the area of supplying and distributing energy products. in this case, no 
particular joint strategy could be noticed, although on the level of regional connections 
within the EU, we can notice that in some areas certain progresses in developing more 
coordinated planning have been achieved (Bufon 2011b).
This is also the case of a more coordinated governance of coastal areas in the 
mediterranean Region, according to the EU commission’s Directive from 2010, 
which refers to the Barcelona convention of 1976 for the Protection of the marine 
Environment and the coastal Region of the mediterranean, and the Protocol on 
integrated coastal Zone management in the mediterranean, which was also adopted 
by the EU council in 2008. The Directive warns about the increasing urban pressure of 
coastal zones in the region, since approximately 40% of the coastline are already built 
and this percentage will presumably be increased to 50% by the year 2025. Urbanisation, 
marine transport communication (mostly due to the transport of energy products) and 
environmental problems arising from this, demand, according to the EU commission’s 
opinion, an integrated governance of coastal zones, as was already established by the 
UN mediterranean commission on sustainable Development at its meetings in Tunis 
in 1997, Monaco in 2001, Catania (Italy) in 2003, and Portorož/Portorose (Slovenia) in 
2005. Article 6 of the 2010 Directive among other matters requires the application of an 
ecosystem-related approach in planning and governing coastal zones; the inclusion of 
an interested local communities and non-governmental organisations in the decision-
making process; horizontal coordination among governmental sectors, and vertical 
coordination among governmental and local administrations with interventions in 
coastal zones that should not lead to excessive urbanisation, but contribute to decreasing 
or eliminating the possible negative environmental impacts. for this purpose, Article 
28 of the Directive encourages cross-border cooperation in the field of exchanging 
all information prior to adopting plans or interventions causing negative impacts on 
coastal zones of neighbouring countries and the necessary coordination of views and 
plans, as well as by adopting bilateral or multilateral agreements (Ec 2010).
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3	 The	regional	perspective
Recent experiences of some cross-border coastal zones in Europe are quite 
encouraging, for instance in the case of developing joint marine environment protection 
policies (e.g. the formation of the international marine Park between corsica [corse/
corsica] and sardinia [sardegna/sardigna]), in the preservation of environmental 
and promoting tourism potentials of the coastal zone (e.g. the integrated Project of 
coastal Zone management along the french-italian border), in evolving transport and 
information flow and joint policies for decreasing the hazards of pollution and accidents 
at sea (e.g. between the United Kingdom and france in the channel area). But the most 
complete and intense cross-border cooperation has been established in the region of 
the Baltic sea (Scott 2003). This cooperation enables some former ‘Eastern’ countries 
to make close contacts with the ‘Western’ European region, thus accessing the EU 
more rapidly, and, in addition, it strengthens the role of Nordic countries within the 
EU. The EU thus recognises this region a special development priority (the so-called 
Northern Dimension), allocating to it additional financial funds. The management of 
joint issues progresses on several levels: the main body is the council of the Baltic 
sea states, which includes the representatives of the EU as well as the representatives 
of the Danish, Estonian, finnish, icelandic, latvian, lithuanian, german, Norwegian, 
Polish and Russian governments; other institutions are the Baltic marine Environment 
Protection commission, the Union of the Baltic cities, the Baltic sea chambers of 
commerce Association and the Baltic sea states sub-regional cooperation, which 
connects sub-state administrative units in the region. The beginnings of regional 
cooperation date back to the 1980s, however, major progress was noticed only after 
1992, when the joint committee on spatial Development in the Baltic sea Region was 
established, and was later on transformed into a development forum named the Baltic 
Bridge. The latter has set four priority goals and working groups connected to these 
goals: (1) formation of strategic regional governance for cross-border cooperation in 
the field of sustainable spatial development; (2) development of the urban network 
for a more coordinated settlement policy; (3) improvement and strengthening of the 
communication and transport system; (4) encouraging sustainable development in 
rural areas. A special, EU-supported project within the community’s framework is 
the Via Baltica, the transport axis on the Tampere-helsinki/helsingfors-Tallinn-Riga 
[Rīga] route, extended to Warsaw [Warszawa] and Berlin, which was already under 
realisation in 1998. This route would also be connected with the so-called TEN-T IA 
Corridor between hamburg and Kaliningrad (parteKa 2006).
Despite the progress of cross-border regional cooperation in the previously 
divided Baltic sea region, unfortunately, a certain extent of regression has to be 
noted in the Northern Adriatic region. here, the Alps-Adriatic Working community 
emerged as soon as in 1978, and connected regions of southern germany, northern 
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italy, Austria, western hungary, as well as slovenia and croatia as republics of the 
former Yugoslavia. Until the 1990s, this was the only ‘Euroregion’ established across 
the iron curtain that geopolitically divided the European ‘West’ and ‘East’. it still 
exists (without Bavaria [Bayern]), but lost a great part of its potentials, even though 
closer cooperation was mostly initiated and conducted in the narrower part of this 
community, including slovenia, friuli-Venezia giulia in italy and carinthia [Kärnten] 
in Austria (the so-called Three-borders region). in fact, after 1990, only carinthia 
expressed more interest for the community, hosting the Alps-Adriatic general 
secretariat in Klagenfurt, whilst the common management is still performed according 
to the member rotation principle (valentin 2007). in the past few years, we can notice 
an increased cooperation between the italian regions Veneto and friuli-Venezia giulia 
and the Austrian region carinthia, aiming to establish a new ‘Euroregion’ to replace the 
‘old’ Alps-Adriatic Working community, also in the sense of rising common transport 
interests related to the Baltic-Adriatic corridor, which has been established as one of 
the priority EU development axes within the TEN-T programme. slovenia is currently 
excluded from this new regional cooperation, since on the EU level it operates as a 
rather centralised country-region. Therefore, it has more problems in the process of 
including into the system of sub-state European cooperation or does not show much 
interest for such cooperation (Bufon 2008).
Anyhow, it is expected that the Adriatic region will become more central in 
the European development and planning context after croatia has entered the EU 
in July 2013 (Bufon 2012). This situation will also improve regional cross-border 
cooperation in the area, as croatia, in contrast to slovenia, is already divided in sub-
state administrative units (regions), and they are also intensifying their integration 
in the European system of inter-regional cooperation. in this regard, some new 
opportunities will certainly be given by the development of the new Adriatic-ionian 
cohesion region within the European Territorial co-operation Programme 2014-2020. 
A strategy document for this region was launched by the EU commission in June 
2014. The strategy will also provide a valuable opportunity for would-be members and 
candidates of the EU to work alongside EU members, in particular contributing to the 
integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union. This is the first EU ‘macro-
regional strategy’ with such a large proportion of non-EU countries (Albania, Bosnia 
and herzegovina, montenegro and serbia) cooperating with EU members (croatia, 
greece, italy, and slovenia). The strategy mainly revolves around the opportunities 
of the maritime economy – ‘blue growth’, land-sea transport, energy connectivity, 
protecting the environment and sustainable tourism – sectors that are bound to play a 
crucial role in creating jobs and boosting economic growth in the region. The starting 
point for this is the maritime strategy for the Adriatic and ionian seas, adopted by the 
commission on 30 November 2012 and now incorporated into the strategy.
Additional possibilities for a ‘common’ development planning in the North 
Adriatic region were brought in the past by the bilateral agreements between italy and 
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former Yugoslavia, which in 1955 largely liberalised the local cross-border movement 
of persons and trade, also by forming a special bilateral commission that regularly 
monitored and directed the implementation of this agreement. in this way, close 
cross-border functional ties could develop, exceeding in many views the intensity of 
cross-border contacts and exchanges along other ‘Western’ borders. Thus the current 
slovenian-italian border has also become known in the wider European context as 
the “most open” border between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ of that time (KlemeNčič & 
Bufon 1991). The local agreement was followed by a new inter-state treaty in 1976, 
based on which a mixed italian-Yugoslav chamber of commerce, and a joint committee 
for water economy issues and water regimes regulation were established. This treaty 
was also premised on the assumption that a customs-free industrial zone will emerge 
on the border between italy and today’s slovenia nearby the city of Trieste, and that a 
joint fishing zone will be established in the Gulf of Trieste. Both projects have not been 
realised, partly due to the resistance of the citizens of Trieste to a greater cooperation 
with the neighbouring country, and partly due to the insufficient interest of both 
neighbouring countries for an increased integration of their border areas.
similar discrepancies emerged on the municipal level, where the border urban 
municipalities of gorizia and Nova gorica – divided by the state border in 1947 in 
two asymmetrical, but complementary parts – in the 1987-1991 period also agreed 
on mutual harmonisation of urban and spatial plans, the common management of the 
motorway truck border terminal with related customs-free zones, the introduction of a 
joint city bus circular route, the preparation of joint cultural events, the introduction of 
the language of the neighbouring country in second level school education programmes 
and other initiatives.
it is surprising that the contents of these and similar agreements have remained 
mostly unrealised even today, despite the fact that slovenia got its independence in 
1991, joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007/08 entered both the schengen area (which 
led to the elimination of all border controls with other EU member states) and the 
Euro zone. it seems as the break-up of Yugoslavia caused the deviation of a wider 
European and bilateral interest from the policies of cross-border cooperation in the 
Adriatic region, since all bilateral committees, which dealt with this issue, stopped 
operating at that time. Italy and Slovenia appear to be quite satisfied with the general 
systemic cooperation, provided by the common membership in the EU. however, they 
did not preserve or develop any additional instruments of cross-border cooperation and 
integration on an interstate or local level, such as they are now being enforced by other 
EU countries along their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ borders (Bufon 2009).
Along with slowly progressing cross-border cooperation and integration policies 
between italy and slovenia, neighbouring relations between slovenia and croatia 
also started to deteriorate significantly, mostly due to border disputes. Not earlier than 
in 2011, also due to the pressure put by the EU, the states came to an agreement to 
eventually resolve the dispute with the help of an international arbitration, clearly 
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showing the failure or even the lack of problem-solving oriented bilateral agreements 
and approaches in this area. Although the functional cooperation on the local population 
level in the Northern Adriatic region has increased despite the lack of institutional 
forms of cross-border integration, thus leading to the formation of a ‘spontaneous’ co-
dependable area in the field of labour, supply, personal services and leisure, which partly 
includes the Croatian area, separate state development policies cause more conflict or 
competitiveness-based situations rather than provide integration opportunities, thus 
hindering the great development potential of this area (Bufon & MinGhi 2000).
4 a sustainable cross-border development of the 
adriatic?
This is especially noticeable in the lack of joint governance of coastal zones, 
as can be seen from the cases of the separate development of the ports in Trieste 
and Koper/capodistria, and the planned construction of gas terminals in the gulf of 
Trieste. There is only slightly more than 10 km air line between Koper/capodistria 
and Trieste, but their development policies are very different. During the Republic of 
Venice, Koper/capodistria was one of the largest marine centres of the eastern part of 
the Adriatic sea, but after the downfall of this state and after the accession of western 
istria [istra] to the Austrian monarchy in the beginning of the 19th century, Trieste 
and Rijeka began developing as the main ports for the Austrian and hungarian parts 
of the monarchy. in the passage from the 19th to the 20th century, Trieste’s population 
increased considerably (from 80,000 in 1850 to 220,000 before World War i), thus 
evolving to one of the largest ports in the mediterranean (from approximately 250,000 
tons of cargo handling in 1850 to about 3.5 million tons at the end of the Austrian 
era). Only after the new delimitation between italy and Yugoslavia, originating from 
World War ii, Koper/capodistria took over the ‘new’ role of being the centre of 
south-western slovenia and the main port of this Yugoslav republic, even though the 
traffic remained poor: in 1962, cargo handling amounted to only 300,000 tons, and in 
1966, when the railway connection with Koper/capodistria was built, cargo handling 
increased to approximately 800,000 tons. in the time of Yugoslavia, the port of Koper/
capodistria was specialised mostly for the import of tropical fruits from the south 
and east mediterranean, as well as other products, also for transit transport to czechia 
and hungary on the one hand, and south germany and Austria on the other. in the 
1970s the import of oil and oil derivatives increased, and container transport gained 
in importance in the 1980s, when transitory transport to Austria had strengthened. 
The latter had concluded a preferential agreement with the port in Trieste, however, 
the port in Koper/capodistria gained in importance in central Europe mostly due to 
competitive prices and better reliability of delivery (Bufon 2003).
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Otherwise, the transport in the port of Koper/capodistria strongly increased after 
slovenia’s independence, when the cargo handling increased by 8% on an annual level 
and exceeded 9 million tons in 2000, achieved 18 million tons in 2013, while in the 
same period cargo handling in the port of Trieste, which in 2013 became the largest port 
in italy according to total cargo transport, increased in the same time to approximately 
55 million tons. We should also mention that about 75% of total cargo handling in the 
port of Trieste is related to the import of oil for the pipeline running to south germany 
and Austria, and that according to the actual commerce, Koper/capodistria has actually 
achieved better results than Trieste. This can be seen mostly in the large increase of 
handled containers, where in 2013 Koper/capodistria achieved 600,000 TEU (in 2000 
it figured only slightly less than 100,000 TEU of cargo handling), while Trieste and 
Venice [Venezia] at the same time managed each only approximately 450,000 TEU of 
cargo handling.
On the other hand, a certain ‘specialisation’ of ports has been occurring in the 
Northern Adriatic region: along with the oil terminal (40% of total 25 million tons 
cargo handling), Venice develops mostly passenger tourist transport and track ferry 
cargo (Ro-Ro) to greece and Turkey, which is also typical for the port of Trieste, 
remaining also the main Adriatic oil terminal (over 40 million tons), while the port 
in Koper/Capodistria is establishing itself in the field of container transport, and also 
vehicle handling between Europe and Asia (over 450,000 vehicles).
The increasing globalisation of traffic flows, the integration of transport systems 
on the EU level and the increased ‘internal’ competition among the leading ports of the 
North sea and the peripheral ports in the mediterranean somehow ‘forced’ the ports 
of the Adriatic sea to start making agreements on joint emergence on the external 
markets. in 2009, the ports in Koper/capodistria, Trieste, Venice and Ravenna formed 
the North Adriatic Port Association (NAPA), which has been also joined by the port 
of Rijeka in 2013. This system of ports consists of approximately 125 million tons 
of cargo handling and takes the fourth place on the European level following the 
Rotterdam-Antwerp [Antwerpen] and hamburg port system (a total of 600 million 
tons) and hamburg (approximately 130 million tons). in this way, the NAPA system 
wants to establish itself within the EU as a significant player in the Marine Highways 
programme, according to which a part of the road track transport would be redirected 
to the sea, thus disburdening the overloaded European highway network and reducing 
cO2 emissions. similarly, the association wishes to establish its own ‘sustainable’ 
character in relation to global transport ways, therefore, it is now promoted as the 
“green way to Europe”, mostly in the relation to the rapidly increasing Asian market, 
since the transport distance between the Korean peninsula and north-European ports is 
about 21,500 km, but only approximately 17,500 km to the ports of the Upper Adriatic 
Sea. This would enable savings in time – approximately five days ride (in case of 
navigation between hong Kong [Xianggang] and hamburg) – and also 12% reduction 
of cO2 emissions. Due to these motives it is prospected that in the following years, 
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marine commerce of the Mediterranean ports will, for the first time in modern history, 
overrun the commerce in North sea ports, and the current ‘peripheral’ Adriatic ports 
will reinforce themselves in the revitalisation of the ‘old’ marine communications 
between Europe and the ‘Orient’.
This development will also demand more intensive inter-state and local 
cooperation in the area of transport, spatial and environmental planning. This goal, 
however, is quite remote, which is proven by the uncoordinated line of the main 
European transport axes TEN-T across the region, as we can see in the case of the 
corridor V on the milan [milano]-Budapest route, where harmonisations took quite 
a long time due to the problem of accessing Trieste and Koper/capodistria on the 
anticipated new railway route, or in the case of the not yet completely defined Baltic-
Adriatic corridor, where three different versions of crossing the Alps are possible, 
namely right after innsbruck (which would advantage the port of Venice), right after 
Villach (which would advantage the port of Trieste), or right after ljubljana (which 
would advantage the port of Koper/capodistria). To solve the issue, the European 
commission has suggested all parties to improve inter-state and inter-regional 
cooperation, and especially to improve transport and planning cooperation between 
Trieste and Koper/capodistria, which would enable a joint and coordinated accession 
of both main North Adriatic ports to the European development axes.
But cooperation is often replaced by potential conflict also in other areas, where 
joint planning would be required, for instance in the planning of gas terminals, which 
the italian government wanted to place in the gulf of Trieste. The supply of energy 
resources, especially natural gas, is quite important for italy, since it does not produce 
enough energy resources by itself and thus significantly depends on the Russian and 
Algerian suppliers via the existing pipelines. By developing the gas terminal system, the 
state would have access to cheaper gas on the ‘free’ market, which would be delivered 
by special boats for the transport of liquefied gas. Therefore, Italy planned to build six 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. The first one and the only one until today was 
built in 2009 on a platform approximately 15 km from the coast near Rovigo, with the 
capacity of 8 billion m3 of gas per year (mostly from Kuwait), covering approximately 
10% of the italian consumption.
it was initially planned that two gas terminals would be built near Trieste: one 
on the platform, the second one on land. This plan was rejected by the interested 
local administrations, and the Republic of slovenia also questioned this issue, which 
would have to be harmonised with the italian side because of the expected cross-
border impact, in accordance with the provisions of the Espoo convention. in 2007, 
the administration of the friuli-Venezia giulia region also intervened in the procedure 
and confirmed the construction of one terminal. This caused a procedural conflict in 
the framework of the ‘traditional’ state-based procedure, since the italian legislation 
determines that regional governments should make the final decisions regarding such 
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interventions, although their realisation in practice strongly depends on the local 
(municipal) level and its spatial and development plans. But in this case, the procedure 
was actually handled by the central government, because in the italian system it has an 
exclusive competence in international coordination with neighbouring countries due to 
the cross-border dimension of the project.
such a confused situation prolonged considerably the decision-making 
administrative procedure, which in the case of this particular project was expected 
to be implemented by the year 2013. Experts have also expressed many doubts about 
the project, since the terminal would be integrated in a very shallow gulf of Trieste 
(depth up to 20 m) with low water mass and limited water flow, which thus cools quite 
significantly during winter, disabling permanent and sufficient energy for repetitive 
gasification of liquefied (frozen) gas. Contrary to this, the object – for the purposes of 
which an additional gas pipeline with the capacity of 165 billion litres of gas per week 
should be built across the entire gulf of Trieste sea bottom – would contribute to further 
excessive cooling of the sea and endangering marine biodiversity, it would negatively 
impact traditional fishing and tourism activities. In addition, environmentalists are also 
concerned about security, considering that the gas plant would be located near a very 
densely inhabited coastal zone.
When the Italian Government in 2009 confirmed the plan, Slovenia as well as 
the Alps-Adriatic green international ecological movement announced a protest at 
the European Court, and local municipalities announced that they would file a legal 
action at the Italian Administrative Court. Since the European administration offices 
found numerous deficiencies in the project proposal, the investor (the Spanish group 
gas Natural) announced a new project for the year 2010 (but actually presented it 
only in 2011), while bilateral talks between italy and slovenia tried to integrate the 
terminal project, rather than in a wider strategy of integrated cooperation, in a system 
of inter-state “transactions”: the italian side proposed to slovenia to accept the project 
in exchange for better inclusion of Koper /capodistria in European transport corridors, 
and the italian co-participation in the eventual construction of a new thermonuclear 
plant in slovenia.
Also in 2010 the situation further complicated, since the slovenian government 
started thinking about setting up a ‘competitive’ terminal near Koper/capodistria 
(although the municipality of Koper/capodistria was against the construction of any 
gas terminal in the gulf of Trieste), and since croatia also planned to realise a similar 
project on the existing oil terminal on the island of Krk near Rijeka with the assistance 
of a german investor.
On the other hand, at the European level aims for searching ‘alternative’ energy 
sources to the Russian gas became quite weaker after the political crisis in the southern 
mediterranean, the completion of North stream, namely the new sub-sea pipeline in 
the Baltic, which has since the end of 2011 directly connected Russia and germany, 
and the intensification of the preparations for the construction of South Stream, which 
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would supply gas across the Black sea and the Balkans to italy and Austria. After 
the catastrophe in fukushima, the concern for possible consequences caused by an 
explosion of a gas terminal is also increasing and the new italian government, facing 
the domestic financial issues, appears to be much more reluctant in supporting the 
previous investment plans, although the Ukrainian crisis has significantly slowed 
down the cooperation between the EU and Russia, thus re-opening again the ‘energy 
issue’ in Europe. however, due to higher expected costs, delayed administrative 
procedure, ecological and general endangerment as well as a modified global energy-
related context, now related in particular to cheaper oil offer, italy has given up on 
the construction of the second gas terminal near Brindisi, and the central authorities 
do not show a particular interest for a similar object in the gulf of Trieste, which 
is additionally ‘burdened’ by both the negative opinion of the local authorities and 
the neighbouring country, and thus consequently by the ‘involvement’ of European 
officials. Nevertheless, the prospected withdrawal of the project should not be explained 
with the ‘failure’ of any possibility for cross-border agreements and cooperation, since 
this would be quite a bad instruction for the future and for the implementation of joint 
and sustainable forms of planning in the Adriatic region.
5 Conclusions
cross-border policies are most likely the most visible expression of the new 
management and planning system, which gradually evolved within the scope of the EU. 
in this ‘Europeanisation’ process of spatial and development policies, new institutional 
structures and ties that by necessity cross state borders and erase traditional hierarchies 
in the decision-making process, have emerged. According to some authors (e.g. 
caStellS 1998), a new, post-modern socio-political ‘network’ structure or authority 
is being formed, which is then expressed in the system of the so-called ‘multi-level 
governance’, where the sub-state dimension joins the inter- and supra-state integration 
dimension. The first dimension is somehow personified by the European Council, the 
second by the European commission and the European Parliament, and the third by 
different Euroregions and cross-border associations of regions and local authorities. 
Within such a context, the interreg programme functions as an actual possibility of 
implementing a multi-level network of governance, and can be regarded as a ‘success 
story’ of European integration policies in the field. This project-oriented cross-border 
cooperation and integration is also a reflection of a typical European practice that on 
the one hand boosts different pragmatic ‘Eurocratic’ agencies and committees, and on 
the other hand new and unimagined development scenarios and ‘visions’ for the future. 
The latter are mostly a subject of the European spatial Development Policy, which, 
however, has to constantly cope with various development and spatial regulations 
since the perspective of the ‘open’ European social and planning area is still divided 
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into ‘closed’ and fragmented national and sub-state systems that, after all, get their 
meaning in the very European principle of subsidiarity.
in any case, changes in the function and status of different territorial units and 
levels lead to changes in the function and status of their borders, which in today’s 
Europe mostly move in the continuum between socio-cultural divergence and socio-
economic integration. it is this relationship that gives rise to major problems in relation 
to cross-border cooperation, as one could find here a considerable discrepancy between 
expectations and needs of the local population, and the real practice of cross-border 
policies. communities on both sides of the border are simultaneously spatially divided 
and socially connected: spatial division is mostly dependent on the typology of the 
border regime, or (in the case of the schengen space) rather on the harmonisation 
of development plans, which can pose major or minor obstacles to cross-border 
movements and activities, while social connection depends on the level of socio-
cultural homogeneity and better or worse functional integration of both the borderland 
population and space. The term cross-border cooperation itself presupposes that there 
exists a certain ‘obstacle’, that is the border, that has to be overcome, while the term 
social and spatial (re)integration calls for complete removal of the ‘obstacle’ (houtuM 
& Struever 2002). in such a context, analysts of border situations and potentials of 
cross-border co-dependence have to consider both the symbolic and functional nature 
of this ‘obstacle’ since it can be established that it is precisely because internal borders 
no longer function as functional obstacles in the EU that they increasingly assume the 
role of symbolic, mental borders, which can become, again, a real obstacle to actual 
(re)integration of the border area and society. Borders therefore everywhere ‘produce’ 
environments of simultaneous potential opportunity or danger, contact or conflict, 
cooperation or competition, convergence or divergence (Bufon 2014).
The case discussed shows the need for a more appropriate governance of 
different horizontal (spatial and sectorial) as well as vertical (hierarchical) policies in 
planning cross-border cooperation or social and spatial (re)integration of borderlands 
and population, especially if we try to create a more sustainable and long-lasting 
development plan for our increasingly globalised and co-dependent ‘common home’.
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